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Introduction to Pension Policy 
 
The U.S. pension system needs fixing. While some of its problems 
are longstanding, the system overall is in decline. Projections of the 
future are not certainties, and some analysts differ, but it appears likely 
that the financial security of current workers when they retire will be 
less than that of current retirees. For workers relying on 401(k) plans 
(which were named after the Internal Revenue Code section that enabled 
them), dramatic declines in the financial markets around the world in 
2008 turned retirement security formerly provided to long-tenure work-
ers by defined benefit plans into a system of retirement roulette. Work-
ers in 401(k) plans are gambling that they will not be retiring in a period 
of dramatic stock market declines, such as experienced in 2008.
By international standards, the U.S. pension system performs poorly. 
When measured in a comparable fashion, the U.S. poverty rate for peo-
ple age 65 and older is more than twice as high as in other high-income 
countries (Pension Rights Center 2007). The move toward 401(k) plans 
has reduced the extent to which the pension system provides annui-
ties and survivors benefits, reducing retirement income security. People 
who work for employers that offer 401(k) plans often do not participate, 
and when they do they tend to make poor financial decisions. Employ-
ers are abandoning defined benefit plans for workers while maintain-
ing generous pensions for executives. People in defined benefit plans 
who are laid off suffer portability losses, while their employers’ plans 
receive corresponding actuarial bonuses. Long-lived retirees in defined 
benefit plans have the real value of their benefits decimated by inflation, 
while long-lived retirees in defined contribution plans risk running out 
of money because of not having annuitized their account balances. 
The pension system is supposed to provide secure and adequate 
retirement income. In both respects, the U.S. system needs better solu-
tions. With the decline in defined benefit plans and the increasing reli-
ance on 401(k) plans, future retirees will have less secure and less 
adequate retirement income than current retirees. While that outcome 
would not occur if all workers covered by 401(k) plans contributed to 
their plans consistently and made wise investment decisions, research 
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shows that many people do not contribute consistently and some do a 
poor job of managing their 401(k) plans.
Pension policy is complex. It involves issues relating to taxation, 
labor economics, finance and behavioral finance, law, actuarial science, 
business administration, and accounting. Drawing on these disciplines, 
but taking an economist’s perspective, this book discusses pension pol-
icy for U.S. private sector employer-provided pension plans. In analyz-
ing pension policy, it addresses two questions: 1) What is the pension 
policy problem? and 2) What are the possible solutions? The book’s 
focus is the search for better solutions for pension policy.
The United States has a federal system of government, where states 
play an important role in the development of policies in some areas. 
The 50 states provide the opportunity for social experimentation on 
policy innovations at a smaller level than the national level. That pos-
sibility for experimentation, however, is not available in the pension 
system because federal law preempts state law on pension issues. For 
this reason, international experience is particularly important in study-
ing innovations in pension policy. Thus, this book presents lessons for 
U.S. policy from the experience of other countries. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO PENSIONS
The two main types of pension plans are defined benefit plans and 
defined contribution plans. Hybrid plans combine features of both. 
Defined benefit plans base benefits on a benefit formula that usually 
involves the worker’s years of service and earnings. Examples of types 
of defined benefit plans include final salary plans, where the benefit 
is based on the average of the last few years of earnings, and career 
average plans, where the benefit is based on average earnings over the 
worker’s career. 
Defined contribution plans are retirement savings plans where the 
worker accumulates assets in an individual account. The most promi-
nent U.S. example is 401(k) plans, where the worker generally must 
contribute to participate, and where the employer may contribute based 
on the worker’s contribution. When this book refers to U.S. defined con-
tribution plans, it generally is referring to 401(k) plans, since they have 
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become nearly synonymous with defined contribution plans because of 
their prevalence. In 2005, there were $2.4 trillion in 401(k) plans and 
$0.4 trillion in non-401(k) defined contribution plans (USDOL 2008).1
When the landmark pension legislation, the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), was passed, pension coverage 
was primarily provided by defined benefit plans. In part because of the 
effects of that act and of subsequent legislation, pension participation 
has shifted away from defined benefit plans and toward defined contri-
bution plans. According to the U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL), 
since 1984 more workers have been active participants in defined con-
tribution plans than have been in defined benefit plans. By the early 
2000s, considerably more than twice as many workers were active par-
ticipants in defined contribution plans as were in defined benefit plans 
(USDOL 2008). The shift from defined benefit to defined contribution 
plans has meant the shift of investment risk from employers to employ-
ees, but it has reduced risks for job-changing or laid-off employees.
The 401(k) plan is usually participant-directed. That means that 
participants decide their investment, at least for the plan’s assets that 
derive from the participant’s own contributions. In 401(k) plans, 
employee choice plays a large role. Participation is typically voluntary. 
Employees who choose to participate also can choose, within limits, 
what percentage of salary to contribute. They choose investments from 
the options offered by the plan. 
A more recent development in U.S. pensions is a hybrid plan called 
a cash balance plan. These plans are hybrids because they combine fea-
tures of both defined benefit and defined contribution plans. To employ-
ees they have many features of defined contribution plans, while to 
employers they are funded like defined benefit plans. In 1995, 3 percent 
of defined benefit participants were in cash balance plans (Elliott and 
Moore 2000). A decade later, cash balance plans accounted for a quarter 
of defined benefit plan participants (USDOL 2008).
Legislation has created several new types of plans. The Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 introduced a new type of hybrid plan, one com-
bining defined benefit and 401(k) features—the DB(k) plan. The legis-
lation enabling that plan will take effect in 2010. Earlier legislation had 
created the Roth IRA and the Roth 401(k). With the two Roth plans, 
contributions are not tax-deductible, but benefits received at retirement 
are tax-free.
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Other countries have also had major changes in pensions. In recent 
years, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany, Norway, and New 
Zealand have added employer mandates for pension provision, making 
employer mandates a major trend. The Netherlands and Iceland have 
introduced hybrid pension plans. Germany and Japan have introduced 
new types of defined contribution plans.
At the same time that these changes were occurring in the real world, 
economists have advanced the economic analysis of pensions. With the 
development of behavioral economics, we better understand the prob-
lems people encounter interacting with the pension system, particularly 
with 401(k) plans. The development of individual account plans has led 
to a more sophisticated analysis of those plans and to a new emphasis 
on understanding annuities. 
BASIC ISSUES IN PENSION POLICY
To introduce pension policy, this section discusses nine issues that 
affect pension financing. Countries use a wide range of approaches 
in addressing the basic financing issues discussed in this chapter. The 
issues discussed here represent fundamental questions about retirement 
income financing that must be addressed in designing new pension sys-
tems or changing established ones. 
Issue 1: Should the Private Pension System Be Voluntary or 
Mandatory? 
A number of countries, including Australia, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Finland, France, Chile, Mexico, and the Netherlands, require most 
employees to be covered by a pension plan, either by law or by col-
lective bargaining agreements. While U.S. employers have long pro-
vided pensions voluntarily, they also have a long tradition of staunchly 
opposing mandates. Nonetheless, the topic of extending coverage by 
mandate is perennial in the policy debate because of the failure of other 
approaches to cover more than half of the private sector workforce.
To encourage, rather than to mandate, workers to participate in 
pensions, the federal and state governments provide tax incentives, 
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employers provide matching contributions to 401(k) plans, and, increas-
ingly, employers that offer 401(k) plans are automatically enrolling new 
employees. The government has added the Saver’s Credit to increase 
the incentive to participate for low-income workers. The Saver’s Credit 
provides a tax credit to low-income workers with tax liability who par-
ticipate in a pension plan. 
Other countries have gone further, establishing a range of man-
dates with increasingly greater degrees of compulsion—mandates that 
employers provide plans (but that workers don’t need to participate), 
mandates that employers offer matching contributions, mandates for 
automatic enrollment of employees with opt-out, and mandates that 
employees participate. In recent years, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Germany, Norway, and New Zealand have added employer mandates 
for pension provision, but with voluntary employee participation.
Mandates can differ in the way they treat employers and employees. 
In Australia, the mandate requires both that employers offer a plan and 
that employees participate. By contrast, the United Kingdom mandates 
that employers offer a plan, but participation by employees is voluntary. 
U.S. pension law does not require employers to offer a plan, but if they 
do, they must cover most full-time employees. 
Mandates also differ in the extent to which they cover the work-
force. Mandates on employers need to recognize that most employers 
are small employers employing a few people. Many are not even busi-
nesses, but are homeowners employing someone to take care of their 
children or clean their house. Mandates may exclude small employ-
ers who employ, for example, fewer than 10 employees, employees 
working in households, young employees, low-wage employees, and 
employees working fewer than a minimum number of hours or with 
short tenure. In countries where pension plans are voluntarily provided 
by employers, the government may set minimum standards as to which 
workers (or what percentage of the workforce of the employer sponsor-
ing a plan) are included in the plan. 
The United States and nearly all other countries have a mandatory, 
state-operated pension—social security. Some people argue that instead 
of mandating pensions, why not simply increase the generosity of social 
security. Social security, however, is not funded, while private pensions 
are.
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Although mandates are capable of greatly increasing pension cover-
age, they do so at the cost of loss of individual choice. The United States 
has not mandated pensions, but it has moved toward greater degrees of 
encouragement. 
Issue 2: If Private Pensions Are Voluntary, to What Extent Should 
the Government Encourage Them? 
All countries with well-developed voluntary pension systems 
encourage pensions by providing preferential tax treatment. In Canada 
and the United States, pension plans receive tax preferences that allow 
money to accumulate tax-free. Countries, such as New Zealand, that 
have not provided tax preferences for pensions, but have treated them 
like other forms of savings, have had few employers provide pensions. 
A progressive personal income tax provides greater tax incentive 
and greater tax subsidy to higher-income persons than to lower-income 
persons. This incentive is upside down. High-income persons are 
already more likely to save for retirement than are low-income per-
sons. An alternative approach would be to provide everyone a limited 
tax credit for pension savings, which would provide the same marginal 
incentive to workers at different income levels. The tax treatment of 
pensions is considered in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Issue 3: Who Is Best Able to Bear the Inherent Financial and 
Demographic Risks in Pension Plans? 
Pension plans can involve five types of actors: employees, labor 
unions, employers and employers’ organizations, financial service pro-
viders, and government. Risks could be borne by any of these actors. 
The primary decision as to who bears risks is made when policymakers 
or the pension provider decides whether to offer defined benefit, defined 
contribution, or hybrid plans. With defined benefit plans, typically the 
provider bears the financial market risk, as well as the demographic risk 
that the participants will live longer on average than expected. However, 
in cases of bankruptcy of the sponsoring firm, the financial risk can be 
borne by workers. Countries where defined benefit plans predominate 
include Germany, Japan, Canada, Ireland, and the Netherlands. With 
defined contribution plans, the participant bears the financial market 
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risk. If the plan does not provide annuitized benefits, the participant also 
bears the demographic risk that he or she will live longer than expected. 
Countries where defined contribution plans predominate include Aus-
tralia and Sweden. The United States and the United Kingdom, and to 
a lesser degree Canada and Ireland, have seen a trend toward defined 
contribution plans. 
With hybrid plans, the financial and demographic risks can be borne 
in different ways. For example, with cash balance plans, the participant 
may bear some financial market risk (as such risk affects the credit-
ing rate provided by the plan) and may bear life expectancy when not 
annuitizing their account balance. Risk-bearing in pension plans is con-
sidered in more detail in Chapter 6, and hybrid plans are considered in 
Chapter 7.
Issue 4: Should the Government Mandate Insurance or 
Guarantees for Pension Benefits? 
The government requires that benefits in some plans be guaranteed 
in Finland, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the province of Ontario in 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In Japan, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom and the United States, mandatory pension 
benefit insurance for defined benefit plans is provided. This insurance 
covers the risk that the sponsoring firms will declare bankruptcy without 
having fully funded their pension plans. Chile, Argentina, Mexico, and 
Switzerland provide some form of insurance or guarantee of account 
balances in defined contribution plans. Pension insurance programs and 
guarantees are discussed in Chapter 6.
Issue 5: Who Should Pay for Pension Plans? 
Ultimately, according to economic theory, regardless of whether 
the employer or employee makes the contribution, the employees bear 
the cost, either through reduced wages relative to what they would be 
without a pension plan or through direct contributions. This process is 
clearly visible in the trade-offs labor unions make in collective bargain-
ing, but this tenet of economic theory is greeted with skepticism among 
noneconomists. 
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The question remains as to who should finance the pension plan. 
Should the funding come from employers, employees, or both? In the 
United States, funding for private sector defined benefit plans comes 
almost entirely from employers. In Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
most other countries with substantial numbers of defined benefit plans, 
employees contribute to those plans and receive a tax deduction for 
doing so. In some defined benefit plans in Canada, the employees’ con-
tribution rate has been increased as a response to the greater benefit 
costs resulting from longer life expectancy. In the United States, private 
sector employees do not receive a tax deduction for contributions to 
defined benefit plans, but they do receive a tax deduction for contribu-
tions to 401(k) plans. 
The lack of tax deductibility of employee contributions to U.S. 
private sector defined benefit plans is an anomaly. It is not the case 
for employees in U.S. state and local government plans, and it is not 
the case for defined benefit plans in all other countries with significant 
numbers of those plans. The question of who should pay for pensions is 
considered in Chapter 8, including whether employee contributions to 
U.S. private sector defined benefit plans should be tax deductible.
Issue 6: To What Extent Should Pension Portfolios Be Regulated? 
In the United Kingdom and the United States, defined benefit pen-
sion portfolios are governed by the mandate that the portfolios be pru-
dently invested. Investments are not judged in isolation but within the 
context of their role in the pension portfolio. In the United Kingdom, no 
more than 5 percent of the defined benefit plans assets can be invested 
in the securities of the sponsoring employer. In the United States, the 
limit is 10 percent. 
Problems with the investment of pension plans occur in the defined 
contribution sector. For example, employees of Enron lost millions of 
dollars when that company collapsed, because many employees were 
heavily invested in their employer’s stock, counter to basic ideas of risk 
diversification.
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Issue 7: What Types of Organizations Should Be Allowed to 
Sponsor Pension Plans? 
In most countries with private pension systems, employers are 
allowed and encouraged to provide private pension plans. In many coun-
tries, multiemployer, industry, or union organizations are allowed to 
sponsor or cosponsor pension plans. These countries include the Neth-
erlands, Japan, Canada, Germany, and the United States. Proposals for 
raising U.S. pension coverage have included some that would extend 
the role of multiemployer plans to efficiently provide pensions through 
economies of scale for employees who work for small employers. 
Issue 8: What Types of Institutions Should Be Allowed to Manage 
Pension Funds?
In defined contribution plans, the employer has traditionally chosen 
the investments, but in 401(k) plans, generally the employer chooses the 
range of funds from which the employee can choose, and the employ-
ee makes the ultimate choice, at least with respect to the employee’s 
contributions. Some defined benefit plans are jointly trusteed, with a 
committee of both employers and employees making the financial deci-
sions. In many countries, including Canada and the United States, multi- 
employer groups jointly manage plans with labor unions. 
In most countries, including the United States, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, employers are allowed to manage pension plans. In 
Japan, however, pension plans must be managed by financial institu-
tions external to the sponsoring company. In Japan, employers play 
little role, only serving as a collection agent for pension contributions, 
which are transmitted to a pension fund management company. 
Other than employers and unions, a variety of financial institutions 
can manage pension funds. Pension fund management can be provided 
by life insurance companies, mutual funds, banks, or companies spe-
cially constituted to manage pension funds. The organizations can be 
profit-making entities or nonprofit entities. In Chile, only special insti-
tutions established specifically to manage pension funds are allowed to 
do so. In most countries, including Japan, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, insurance companies and investment managers 
are allowed to manage pension funds. In Germany, banks play a major 
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role in managing pension funds, while their role in the United States is 
limited to offering Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs).
Pension fund management can be centralized in one or a few enti-
ties, or it can be decentralized. Within that framework, investment man-
agement can be done on an individual or a collective basis.
Issue 9: What Role Should Defined Benefit Plans, Defined 
Contribution Plans, and Hybrid Plans Play? 
The role of defined benefit plans has declined in a number of coun-
tries, including the United States and the United Kingdom. Some com-
mentators have argued that defined benefit plans are dinosaurs—they 
will eventually become extinct because of changes in the labor market 
environment. Workers are more mobile, and consequently they tend to 
favor defined contribution plans. However, the decline has been much 
more limited in Canada, Japan, and the Netherlands. Canada has a 
long-established policy of maintaining a level playing field as it relates 
to allowable contributions to defined contribution and defined benefit 
plans, which may have played a role in the limited decline of defined 
benefit plans. 
A U.S. government policy, perhaps unintended, is the government’s 
apparent encouragement of defined contribution plans over defined 
benefit plans. As an example of the stricter regulation of defined benefit 
plans than defined contribution plans, pension law requires defined bene- 
fit plans to provide annuities as the default option, requiring spousal 
consent if a different option is chosen. By contrast, 401(k) plans face 
no such requirements. The looser regulation of 401(k) plans may be an 
historical artifact resulting from the origins of 401(k) plans as second-
ary plans provided by employers that offered defined benefit plans.
Discouragement of defined benefit plans also may be an unintended 
consequence of policies that are designed to strengthen defined bene-
fit plans but that also increase their costs. It may result in part from 
government policies designed to reduce the tax expenditure associated 
with defined benefit pensions by giving them tax preferences. It may 
be due to government policies that provide options to 401(k) plans, 
such as deductibility of employee contributions, that are not provided 
to defined benefit plans.
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Both defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans impose 
risks on workers. In U.S. defined benefit plans, if a worker is laid off 
at age 50, his future pension benefit will be based on his wages at age 
50. There will be no adjustment for inflation that occurs from that point 
up to the age when he will be eligible to receive benefits, which could 
be age 65. British workers are protected against this risk by mandatory 
price indexation of deferred vested benefits. Reforms may be warranted 
to provide further protection for workers who are laid off. This could 
be viewed as costly to employers, or it could be viewed as preventing 
employers from receiving an actuarial bonus, and thus an incentive, in 
defined benefit pension plans when they lay off workers. 
In general, however, workers are better off when covered by both 
defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans. The two types of 
plans together, with their different patterns of risk-bearing, provide risk 
diversification. Hybrid plans blend the risk characteristics of defined 
benefit plans, generally imposing more risks on employees than tradi-
tional defined benefit plans but fewer risks than 401(k) plans. Hybrid 
plans are discussed further in Chapter 7.   
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOOK
This book focuses on current pension policy issues. It takes into 
account the major changes in the prevalence of pension plans of dif-
ferent types, in pension law, and in the economic analysis of pensions. 
The book approaches pension policy from different perspectives. One 
perspective is the international perspective, with a focus on lessons 
from international experience for U.S. pension policymakers. While 
attention is paid to the economic analysis of pensions, the book focuses 
on advancing our understanding of pension policy. The book’s goal is 
to improve pension policy, and ultimately the lives of retirees, in the 
United States and elsewhere.
While the book covers a broad range of topics, pension plans and 
pension policy are both complex, and the coverage is not complete. 
Nonetheless, readers seeking an overall introduction to pension policy 
may read the book from cover to cover; other readers may find it more 
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profitable to read particular chapters for a survey of policy issues of 
particular interest. 
Policy issues addressed include the following four questions:
1) How can pension coverage be increased?
2) What can be done to save defined benefit plans?
3) How can annuitization be increased in defined contribution 
plans?
4) How should pension policy adjust to continuing increases in 
life expectancy?
“Mandates: Pathways to Expanding Private Sector Provision” 
(Chapter 2) analyzes issues relating to making private pensions manda-
tory, including by privatizing social security with individual accounts. 
It expands on the brief discussion of mandates in this chapter. A num-
ber of countries have mandated individual account plans that are man-
aged by pension fund providers. Countries use mandatory individual 
accounts primarily in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, 
but Hong Kong and Sweden are other notable examples. 
Some policy experts have discussed proposals mandating that 
employers withhold from payroll employee contributions, with auto-
matic enrollment but worker opt-out, as an alternative to individual 
accounts being mandated through social security. While social secu-
rity provides a uniform structure of benefits and contributions across 
the workforce, mandatory private pensions allow greater flexibility and 
diversity in the types of arrangements. 
Administrative feasibility, meaning functionality at reasonable cost, 
is a key issue with mandates involving small employers. Many small 
employers do not have automated payroll systems, but instead write 
payroll checks by hand or pay in cash. For those employers, withhold-
ing pension contributions and transmitting them to a pension fund pro-
vider is administratively more costly than it is for large employers with 
automated payroll systems who can make electronic transfers of funds. 
For this reason, some employer mandates exempt employers below 
a certain size, such as 10 full-time employees. Administrative issues 
relating to employer mandates are discussed in Chapter 2.
“Extending Pension Coverage” (Chapter 3) analyzes a wide range 
of issues relating to pension coverage. It discusses measures of pen-
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sion coverage in defined contribution plans. The standard measure of 
coverage overstates the percentage of workers accruing benefits based 
on their current work. A measure of pension coverage that requires that 
the worker actually be accruing pension benefits, rather than that the 
worker just have a 401(k) account, yields lower coverage than do tra-
ditional measures (Turner, Muller, and Verma 2003). The chapter also 
discusses the sensitivity of pension coverage to changes in income tax 
rates (Reagan and Turner 2000). 
Pension coverage patterns differ if examined within the context of 
a family rather than an individual. Because fewer women are married 
than in the past, the rising pension coverage rate for women as workers 
is partially offset by declining pension coverage of women as spouses 
of men with coverage (Even and Turner 1999).
Only about half of all workers participate in any type of pension 
plan at a given point in time. Some workers do not contribute to a 
401(k) plan even though their employer offers a matching contribution. 
The chapter discusses the role of inertia versus economic incentives as 
an explanation for why workers turn down pension coverage (Turner 
and Verma 2007). At least five reasons may explain nonparticipation by 
workers eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan. Besides the traditional 
economic reason of lack of economic incentives, four other reasons 
apply to workers who do not fit the classic definition of being well-
informed and rational: 1) high discount rates causing them to place little 
value on future benefits, 2) lack of information, 3) lack of willpower to 
follow through on a decision, and 4) failure to make a decision because 
of passivity, ambivalence, and other similar behavioral factors. The last 
two reasons are often grouped together as inertia. Understanding the 
different reasons may aid in developing effective policies that would 
help workers achieve good pension outcomes. 
“Labor Market Policy: Portability and Retirement” (Chapter 4) 
considers how pension plans—in this case particularly defined benefit 
plans—affect people who change jobs or are laid off. A worker laid off 
in his 50s will generally see the investments in his defined contribution 
plan continue to increase in value. However, his defined benefit plan 
will continuously decline in value because the nominal wages used to 
calculate his benefits will be eroded by inflation occurring between the 
point of layoff and the point of eligibility for benefits, which could be 
as late as age 65.
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Many workers favor phased retirement as a way to gradually tran-
sition into retirement rather than a cliff-style retirement of going from 
full-time work to zero work (Latulippe and Turner 2000). Early retire-
ment in certain physically demanding occupations is facilitated by pen-
sions. Discussions of retirement age policy often focus on people with 
physically demanding jobs where postponed retirement would be dif-
ficult (Turner and Guenther 2005). 
While it is often assumed that defined contribution plans do not 
affect retirement decisions, empirical evidence suggests that workers 
postpone retirement during economic downturns because of the asso-
ciated decline in their account balances, possibly destabilizing labor 
markets by increasing supply at the same time that demand is reduced 
(Ghilarducci and Turner 2007). 
“Tax Policy: Influencing Coverage and the Structure of Pensions” 
(Chapter 5) discusses the tax treatment of the tax basis in contribu-
tory pension plans. Tax basis will increasingly be an important issue for 
baby boomer retirees because it arises in IRAs and 401(k) plans when 
workers make nondeductible contributions. The tax basis is not indexed 
for inflation. Thus, its real value erodes over a worker’s career because 
of inflation. Roth 401(k) plans provide eligible workers a choice as to 
the tax treatment of their pension contributions, in that they have tax-
able contributions but tax-free benefits. These plans thus do not have 
the problem of inflation eroding the tax basis or of the worker need-
ing to provide years of contribution records to prove the tax status of 
withdrawals.
The tax code contains a number of penalties and requirements asso-
ciated with fixed ages as they relate to pension plans. An example is the 
age of 70 ½, which is the age at which pension distributions must occur 
if the participant is no longer employed with the sponsoring employer. 
Employees who withdraw 401(k) plan money from their plans before 
age 59 ½ and are still working for the sponsoring employer must pay 
a 10 percent penalty, as well as paying income taxes. This chapter dis-
cusses the role of fixed ages in pension tax law and whether these ages 
should be raised or indexed as life expectancy increases.
“Managing Pension Risk” (Chapter 6) investigates a broad range of 
risks facing pension participants and plan sponsors. For workers hav-
ing long careers with a single employer, defined benefit plans promise 
retirement benefits with substantially less risk than the retirement bene-
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fits promised by 401(k) plans. Defined benefit plans, however, can be 
risky for workers who change jobs or are laid off. 
Sponsors of defined benefit plans face longevity risk relating to the 
longevity of their retirees. Both the cohort and idiosyncratic (individual) 
risks of increased life expectancy are borne by sponsors of defined 
benefit plans but are borne by individual participants in 401(k) plans. 
Cohort life expectancy risk is the risk that on average people in a cohort 
will live longer than expected. Idiosyncratic life expectancy risk is the 
risk that a particular individual will live longer than expected. While the 
idiosyncratic risks can easily be diversified away through risk pooling 
for a large number of people, pooling does not reduce the cohort risk. 
Cohort life expectancy risk can be borne by individuals at low cost, 
while it is expensive for plan sponsors. The opposite pattern holds for 
risk-bearing of idiosyncratic risk, which is expensive for individuals 
but not for plan sponsors because they can diversify it away. 
The chapter also discusses the UK Pension Protection Fund (PPF), 
which is based on an attempt to learn from the U.S. experience with 
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). After more than 30 
years, the PBGC continues to face serious problems, including a large 
deficit. 
“Hybrid Plans: The Best of Both Worlds?” (Chapter 7) focuses on 
the ways that pension plans can be structured to share risks between 
workers and employers. Hybrid defined benefit plans may be desirable 
as a way of preserving the positive aspects for workers of defined bene-
fit plans while reducing the risks that employers face, such as invest-
ment risk and longevity risk. 
While hybrid plans have features of both defined benefit and defined 
contribution plans, some are more like defined benefit plans in that they 
define benefits with a benefit formula; however, they do contain some 
defined contribution features. Hybrid plans that are essentially defined 
benefit plans with defined contribution features shift some of the risk 
traditionally borne by employers to workers. Hybrid pension plans that 
are basically defined contribution plans because the benefit is tied to the 
rate of return on an account balance usually add a rate of return guaran-
tee (Turner and Rajnes 2003). 
Cash balance plans are the best-known U.S. hybrid plans (Turner 
2003a), but employers have also offered other types, such as pension 
equity plans. The new DB(k) plan can be offered starting in 2010. 
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The Netherlands has recently adopted hybrid plans with defined bene- 
fit plan benefit formulas, but in which the workers bear the invest-
ment and demographic risks through variable contribution rates that 
they pay. Iceland has mandatory plans that are hybrids, and the United 
Kingdom has some types of hybrid plans. The ABP plan in the Nether-
lands, which is a hybrid plan, is the largest plan in the world in terms of 
assets. These plans all shift cohort life expectancy risk to participants. 
In addition, a number of types of hybrid plans have been proposed, 
such as life expectancy–indexed defined benefit plans (Chapter 10 and 
Muir and Turner 2007). The chapter discusses reasons for the growing 
role of cash balance plans in the U.S. pension system (Lichtenstein and 
Turner 2005). 
“Financing Pensions for Adequacy and Security” (Chapter 8) 
includes a discussion of the financial decisions made by participants 
in defined contribution plans. This chapter incorporates insights from 
behavioral finance concerning the errors participants make in managing 
their pension investments. Gender differences in pension investments 
are discussed (Hinz, McCarthy, and Turner 1997). 
An assumption underlying the U.S. system of voluntary employee 
participation in defined contribution plans is that individuals make good 
financial decisions. A major weakness of this approach is that many indi-
viduals make poor financial decisions, especially when long planning 
horizons are involved, resulting in retirement income that is insufficient 
to maintain their preretirement living standards. Behavioral finance has 
documented these choices and how they result in outcomes that are 
unfavorable to workers in the long run. Behavioral finance theorists 
have used their insight into the roles that inertia and procrastination 
play in worker behavior to propose defaults that preserve worker choice 
while arguably achieving better long-run outcomes for many workers. 
Once a worker has decided to participate in a 401(k) plan, the fac-
tor most affecting the amount of assets accumulated at retirement is 
how much the participant and employer contribute to the plan. Finan-
cial education can be used to influence the decisions participants make 
(McCarthy and Turner 2000). Defaults in defined contribution plans 
can have large effects on worker participation, but the degree to which 
these effects persist over long periods of time and the degree to which 
they work in different types of financial markets have not been investi-
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gated (Turner 2006). One default that has been proposed is a gradually 
increasing contribution rate. 
The level and disclosure of fees in 401(k) plans is a multibillion 
dollar issue. Pension participants in 401(k) plans annually pay billions 
of dollars in fees. With defined benefit plans, the plans’ expenses are 
borne by the sponsoring employer, but with defined contribution plans, 
most of the expenses are borne by the participants. Participants with 
substantial account balances can easily pay hundreds or even thousands 
of dollars in fees every year. 
In spite of the large amounts of money involved, participants rarely 
know how much they are paying in fees, and thus are not able to make 
informed decisions between alternative options (Turner and Korczyk 
2004). They are purchasing services without knowing the price. While 
transparency is a desirable attribute concerning fees, 401(k) fees are 
opaque. The topic is also important because of the size of the effect 
of apparently small fees on account balances. A fee of 1 percent can 
reduce the account balance of a 401(k) plan by 12 percent over a period 
of 20 years (Muller and Turner 2008). 
While some researchers and organizations have focused on extend-
ing coverage or strengthening 401(k) plans, the policy community for 
the most part appears to have given up on saving defined benefit plans. 
However, policies might strengthen defined benefit plans and slow or 
reverse their decline. A strong retirement income system would ide-
ally contain both defined benefit and defined contribution plans because 
both types provided together do a better job of helping workers deal 
with various risks than either do when provided alone. 
“Pension Benefit Policy: The Search for Lost Pensions and Other 
Issues” (Chapter 9) notes that benefits can be provided to participants 
in defined contribution plans in five ways: 1) as annuities, 2) as lump 
sums, 3) as phased withdrawals, 4) as installment payments, and 5) as 
a series of ad hoc payments. Three issues concerning benefit receipt are 
as follows:
1) What happens to workers’ accounts when they change jobs 
before retirement? 
2) Are workers’ accounts annuitized, taken as a lump sum, taken 
as a phased withdrawal, or taken in installments at retirement? 
3) Are survivor benefits provided?
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Pension law requires defined benefit plans to provide survivor bene-
fits as an option. It does not require 401(k) plans that do not provide 
annuities as an option—which are most 401(k) plans—to provide survi-
vor benefits.2 Because of the complex issues associated with annuities, 
Chapter 10 is devoted to them. This chapter discusses the effect of the 
move toward defined contribution plans on the income inequality of 
pension beneficiaries.
Lost pensions are a problem for some job-changers. This problem is 
the focus of efforts by pension assistance programs and a program run 
by the PBGC, but it has received little attention from economists. The 
United Kingdom and Australia have gone far beyond the United States 
in developing policy to deal with this problem (Blake and Turner 2002). 
Pensions may be lost in the sense that job-leavers subsequently cannot 
find their former employer to claim benefits. That problem is especially 
likely to occur when the sponsoring firm has changed location or name, 
perhaps as a result of having been bought out. 
“The Decline in Annuitization and How to Reverse It” (Chapter 
10) is an important issue because annuities provided by pensions are 
decreasing. They are decreasing because of the decline in traditional 
defined benefit plans—historically a key source of low-cost guaranteed 
lifetime income—and the shift to cash balance plans. Cash balance 
plans are required to provide annuities, but perhaps because the bene-
fit is expressed in terms of an account balance, workers typically take 
their benefits as lump sums. Annuities can be particularly valuable for 
women because women tend to outlive the men in their lives, and their 
risk of poverty at the end of life is greater than for men.
Annuities could potentially play an important role in 401(k) plans. 
While it has been expected that workers would increasingly annuitize 
their 401(k) plans with the decline in defined benefit plans, that has not 
occurred. Annuities have been analyzed extensively in the context of 
Social Security reform, and in the context of individually purchased 
annuities, but little attention has been paid to them in the context of the 
unisex requirement in the 401(k) plan setting. With unisex annuities, 
sometimes single men can receive higher benefits outside the pension 
plan than inside it. Thus, an unintended consequence of the unisex rul-
ings by the Supreme Court may have been that the resulting adverse 
selection has caused most 401(k) plan sponsors not to offer annuities. 
Recently, some plan sponsors have begun offering annuities outside the 
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plan through third-party providers. These annuities take into account 
the different mortality risks of men and women.
The concluding chapter, “Finding Better Solutions,” (Chapter 11) 
discusses the main policy proposals for both 401(k) plans and defined 
benefit plans. In addition, with the goal of maintaining a role for defined 
benefit plans in the retirement income system, it proposes a new type 
of hybrid pension plan—the life-indexed DB plan—that preserves key 
aspects of defined benefit plans while shifting some risk and cost to 
workers. 
Notes
 1. Authors differ in the exact terminology they use to refer to different types of plans. 
In this paper, “pension plans” refers to both defined benefit and defined contribu-
tion plans. Because 401(k) plans so dominate the defined contribution plans in the 
United States, generally 401(k) plans are discussed.  
 2.  Money purchase plans are required to provide annuities with joint and survivor 
benefits.
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